Agenda control for heterogeneous reasoners  by Stolle, Reinhard et al.
The Journal of Logic and
Algebraic Programming 62 (2005) 41–69
 	


 	
	
	
	
www.elsevier.com/locate/jlap
Agenda control for heterogeneous reasoners
Reinhard Stollea,∗, Apollo Hoganb, Elizabeth Bradley c,1
a PARC, 3333 Coyote Hill Road, Palo Alto, CA 94304, USA
b Department of Mathematics, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA
c Department of Computer Science, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309, USA
Received 25 April 2002; received in revised form 6 July 2003; accepted 16 July 2003
Abstract
As artificial intelligence techniques are maturing and being deployed in large applications, the
problem of specifying control and reasoning strategies is regaining attention. Complex AI systems
tend to comprise a suite of modules, each of which is capable of solving a different aspect of the
overall problem, and each of which may incorporate a different reasoning paradigm. The orches-
tration of such heterogeneous problem solvers can be divided into two subproblems: (1) When and
how are various reasoning modes invoked? and (2) How is information passed between various
reasoning modes? In this paper, we explore some solutions to this problem. In particular, we describe
a logic programming system that is based on three ideas: equivalence of declarative and operational
semantics, declarative specification of control information, and smoothness of interaction with non-
logic-based programs. Meta-level predicates are used to specify control information declaratively,
compensating for the absence of procedural constructs that usually facilitate formulation of efficient
programs. Knowledge that has been derived in the course of the current inference process can at any
time be passed to non-logic-based program modules. Traditional SLD inference engines maintain
only the linear path to the current state in the SLD search tree: formulae that have been proved on
this path are implicitly represented in a stack of recursive calls to the inference engine, and formulae
that have been proved on previous, unsuccessful paths are lost altogether. In our system, previously
proved formulae are maintained explicitly and therefore can be passed to other reasoning modules.
As an application example, we show how this inference system acts as the knowledge representation
and reasoning framework of PRET––a program that automates system identification.
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1. Introduction
As artificial intelligence techniques are maturing and being used in large applications,
the problem of specifying control and reasoning strategies is regaining attention. Fur-
thermore, as the complexity of applications is scaling up, it is becoming less feasible to
capture all aspects of an AI system’s functionality in a single reasoning paradigm. Rather,
complex AI systems tend to comprise a suite of modules, each of which is capable of solv-
ing a different aspect of the overall problem and each of which may incorporate a different
reasoning paradigm. There seems to be an emerging sense in the AI research community
that the orchestration of such heterogeneous problem solvers is in itself a difficult problem
that deserves to be solved using AI techniques (e.g., [13,67]). The orchestration problem
can be divided into two subproblems: (1) When and how are various reasoning modes
invoked? and (2) How is information passed between various reasoning modes? In this
paper we present some ideas about how to solve this problem, along with an application
example.
Many languages that are designed for the declarative representation of domain knowl-
edge are variants of first-order logic. One of the major advantages of logical representations
is their clearly defined semantics: the domain knowledge can be interpreted as a logical
theory. Logic programs can also be executed. Ideally, a logic program’s declarative se-
mantics (when interpreted as a logical theory) are equivalent to its operational semantics
(when executed with respect to queries). In practice, the equivalence of declarative and
operational semantics is often sacrificed for various reasons. Purely procedural constructs
like the PROLOG cut, for example, are useful in the construction of efficient programs;
however, their semantics cannot be described declaratively. Furthermore, control infor-
mation is typically encoded implicitly in the static ordering of rules and goals. Finally,
the commonly used principle of negation as failure confuses existential with universal
quantification of non-ground goals.
This paper presents a logic system that accomplishes three important goals:
1. Declarative and operational semantics are equivalent.
2. Control information is represented explicitly, declaratively, and separately from domain
knowledge.
3. Interaction with other programs is facilitated by an explicit representation of the theo-
rem prover’s state.
The first two goals are achieved by implementation of concepts developed as part of
the “RISC” project (Reason Maintenance Based Inference System for Generalized Horn
Clause Logic) at the University of Erlangen [4–6]. The third goal was accomplished by
allowing non-logic-based reasoning modules access to the current state of the theorem
prover. This feature is particularly important for the design of heterogeneous systems that
integrate and orchestrate a variety of domain-specific reasoning techniques. For example,
the logic system presented in this paper is currently used as the knowledge representation
and reasoning framework of PRET, an automated modeling tool that finds ordinary dif-
ferential equations (ODEs) that model black-box dynamical systems [10,12,59,61]. The
achievement of the three goals listed above is crucial to the success of this modeling task,
but the contributions described here generalize well beyond this particular application do-
main. The third goal, in particular, is significant for any automated reasoning system that
integrates several different reasoning modes. The various modules of such a hybrid rea-
soner typically must be able to access knowledge that has been generated before (either
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by themselves or by other modules). In our SLD-based system,2 invocation of different
modules is triggered by the evaluation of subgoals of the currently active goal. Traditional
SLD inference engines maintain only the linear path to the current state in the SLD search
tree [44]. Formulae that have been proved on this path are typically implicitly represented
in a stack of recursive calls to the inference engine, and formulae that have been proved on
previous, unsuccessful paths are lost altogether. In our system, previously proved formulae
are maintained explicitly and therefore can be passed to other reasoning modules.
We use the term “agenda control” to emphasize that the goal of the logic system pre-
sented in this paper is not the control of theorem proving per se. Rather, the purpose is the
control and orchestration of a suite of heterogeneous, higher-level, and possibly domain-
specific, reasoners. In our application domain of dynamic systems modeling, an agenda
may contain items such as “find out if the differential equation is linear” or “see whether
the target system exhibits oscillation”. In a different domain, such as robot planning3 for
example, agenda items may be “figure out where I am” or “take sensor reading from the
right arm sensor”. The purpose of this paper is to describe an implemented knowledge
representation design that is appropriate for encoding a domain theory, associated agenda
items and agenda control, and that lends itself to intuitive specification and manipulation
by domain experts (rather than theorem proving experts). In the internal representation,
domain knowledge turns into logical axioms, and agenda items become goals in the logic
programming sense. Correspondingly, the question of agenda control turns into the task of
defining appropriate strategies and tactics for theorem proving.
The language of the logic system presented in this paper is that of generalized horn
clause intuitionistic logic (GHCIL) [45,46]. The inference engine can be briefly character-
ized as a GHCIL reasoner with declarative meta-level control and explicit representation
of previously derived knowledge. The next three sections describe the GHCIL language,
the meta-level control, and the explicit representation of previously derived formulae. As
an application example, we show how this inference system acts as PRET’s knowledge
representation and reasoning framework. We conclude the paper with some pointers to
related work.
2. The language
2.1. GHCIL clauses
General horn clause intutionistic logic (GHCIL) clauses4 the corresponding are (implic-
itly) universally quantified implications of the following form:
1. Every definite Horn clause is a GHCIL clause.5
2. If A is an atomic formula and B1, . . . , Bn are GHCIL clauses, then A ← B1, . . . , Bn is
a GHCIL clause.
2 The acronym SLD stands for Selecting a literal, using a Linear strategy, restricted to Definite clauses [58].
3 The automated planning community uses the term “agenda” in much the same way.
4 This section is a recapitulation of the corresponding section in [4]. It is included here in order to make this
paper more self-contained.
5 Recall that a definite Horn clause is a clause of the form A ← B1, . . . , Bn (n  0) where A and Bi are all
atomic formulae.
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That is, GHCIL clauses are generalizations of Horn clauses that also allow embedded im-
plications (other GHCIL clauses) in the body. For example,
dedicated(P ) ← (working(P ) ← assigned(W, P ), unfinished(W))
is a GHCIL clause that is not a Horn clause. Informally, its meaning is:
For all people P : P is considered a dedicated person if P is working under the assump-
tion that there is some unfinished work W that is assigned to P .
Thus, embedded implications can be seen as hypothetical statements. For a more detailed
discussion of clausal intuitionistic logic, see [45,46].
In our system, there are several distinguished predicates that may occur in GHCIL
clauses. One of them is falsum: GHCIL clauses having falsum as their head indicate con-
tradictory situations. Negation as failure is not suitable for our purposes because it destroys
the equivalence of declarative and operational semantics. Instead, our intuitionistic se-
mantics uses negation as inconsistency [30] and interprets not(p) as an abbreviation for
falsum ← p. For example, consider the following rulebase:
1: falsum ← male(X), female(X).
2: male(john).
3: female(betty).
4: male(pat).
The query ?not(male(X)) succeeds with X bound to betty, consistent with the interpreta-
tion of the query: “Is there an X such that X is not male?” With negation as failure, on
the other hand, this query would fail; the interpretation in that case would be: “is it not
the case that there is an X such that X is male”, or, in other words, “is it the case that, for
every X, X is not male?” This behavior would be inconsistent with the usual existential
quantification of free variables in queries.
2.2. Evaluation of queries in GHCIL programs
The evaluation of queries is similar to SLD resolution in Horn clause queries. The main
loop of the prover consists of the following steps. Let P be the program and G1, . . . ,Gm
the current goal.
A1. Select a subgoal Gi .
A2. Search P for a clause C = (A ← B1, . . . , Bn) such that A and Gi can be unified by
θ with mgu(θ, A,Gi).
A3. Set the new current goal to (G1, . . . ,Gi−1, B1, . . . , Bn,Gi+1, . . . ,Gm)θ .
An SLD prover searches only the logic program for unifying clauses. Our GHCIL
prover also looks up clauses in the so-called current assumptions. The current assumptions
are a set of unquantified GHCIL clauses. Initially, the current assumptions are empty. But
whenever, in Step A1, a goal Gi of the form D ← H1, . . . , Hk is selected, the prover
B1. adds {H1, . . . , Hk} to the current assumptions,6
B2. tries to prove D (w.r.t. the program plus the extended current assumptions), and
B3. eventually removes {H1, . . . , Hk} from the current assumptions.
6 The hypotheses Hi must be added to the database as clause instances, i.e., it is not possible to use several
different variants of the same hypothesis with different bindings in the same proof. For details see [59].
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In the next section, we describe the extensions of this core GHCIL language that allow
the implementer of the logic program to declaratively control the way in which GHCIL
theories are processed.
3. Expressing control information
Traditionally, the control flow of a logic program is specified by the static ordering
of rules and goals: the programmer expresses control knowledge implicitly by taking ad-
vantage of the inference machine’s properties, e.g., its depth-first-left-right strategy [58].
This approach conflicts with our goal of expressing all information in a declarative way.
A program that relies on a certain evaluation strategy of the inference engine contains
information—control information—that is not reflected by a purely logical interpretation
of the program.
Other common non-logical programming means of achieving efficient control of the
deduction process include the PROLOG cut or the “predicates” assert, retract, and if–then–
else. Such procedural constructs have declarative semantics—if any—that are different
from their operational semantics. They result in a more or less imperative programming
style and destroy the equivalence of procedural and declarative semantics, which is one of
the main reasons for logic programming in the first place.
Meta control is a much better solution. It allows specification of control without inter-
fering with the declarative representation of knowledge. For example, suppose we have the
following declarative knowledge about a small initial segment of the ordinal numbers:
1: ord(succ(X)) ← ord(X).
2: ord(0).
3: ord(ω).
If we were to use this knowledge in a PROLOG system, we would have to reorder the
rules so that Rules 2 and 3 occurred before Rule 1 in order to avoid infinite loops for
existential queries such as ?ord(succ(Z)). When adding new rules (e.g., ord(ω1)), a pro-
grammer must pay close attention to how they interact with the rest of the rules—in this
case ensuring that the new rule is added before Rule 1. That is, in addition to the declarative
knowledge that 0, ω, and their successors are ordinals, we must also keep in mind the
correct order for the rules and the control strategy of the inference engine. In other words,
object-level information (in this case, knowledge about the structure of ordinal numbers)
is intertwined with information about how to use object-level information (e.g., which rule
should be used first). We call the latter control-level information.
If, instead, we separate control-level information from object-level information, we can
specify the logical theory of ordinal numbers without worrying about the operational inter-
pretation, or execution, of the theory as a logic program. In a separate set of meta control
rules, we can then—again declaratively—specify the control information. The set of con-
trol rules, together with the object rules, represents a logical theory about the control of the
logic program; we need only specify that Rule 1 is examined after any other rules, or we
might specify that ground clauses are always to be preferred over non-ground clauses for
the predicate ord/1.7
7 A predicate p of arity n is denoted p/n.
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3.1. Static control: abstraction levels
One method for specifying meta control in a declarative fashion is abstraction levels:
static numeric annotations that describe the order in which clauses are considered to con-
struct proofs, enforcing the preference of abstract proofs over less-abstract ones. These
impose static global constraints on the search for a proof. To every rule, the programmer
assigns an abstraction level. For example, suppose that there are only two abstraction lev-
els, low and high. Then any proof that uses only clauses with high abstraction levels will
be preferred to any proof that uses a clause with a low abstraction level, even if the latter
proof is much shorter.8
The implementation of this scheme is straightforward; the inference engine proceeds
to a less-abstract level only if the search for a proof at the more-abstract level fails. (This
means that bad choices for abstraction levels affect only speed, and not correctness or
completeness.)
Abstraction levels are a crude form of meta control. They are static and, though global,
have a granularity at the clause level. Because of this, abstraction levels are often not
general enough. The next section presents an example that calls for dynamic meta control.
3.2. Dynamic control: meta rules
In PROLOG, as in many other logic-based knowledge representation systems, control in-
formation interferes with logical statements in order to achieve an efficient evaluation of huge
sets of unit clauses [58]. Consider the following example (adapted from Example 8 of [4]).
grandparent(X, Y ) ← var(Y ), !, parent(X,Z), parent(Z, Y ).
grandparent(X, Y ) ← parent(Z, Y ), parent(X,Z).
This example shows how efficiency considerations that have nothing to do with the de-
clarative meaning of the logic program complicate the code. Expressing efficient control
strategies for logical theories that are more complex than grandparent requires increasingly
baroque and hard-to-understand coding.
In our system, this kind of implicit control information is not necessary. We simply
express the logical fact by the clause
grandparent(X, Y ) ← parent(X,Z), parent(Z, Y ).
In order to ensure an efficient evaluation, we specify that the subgoal that contains the
ground argument must be evaluated before the subgoal that contains the variable:
before(L1, L2) ← goal(L1, parent(X, Y )),
goal(L2, parent(Y, Z)),
ground(X), var(Z).
before(L2, L1) ← goal(L1, parent(X, Y )),
goal(L2, parent(Y, Z)),
ground(Z), var(X).
8 However, the programmer will typically assign abstraction levels to the rules in such a way that short proofs
are also abstract proofs.
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At first sight, the PROLOG formulation seems shorter and simpler. We argue that the num-
ber of characters needed is not a good measure of complexity. The order of clauses and
goals and—more importantly—the cut in the PROLOG program implicitly contain critical,
complex information that is made explicit in our meta program. Furthermore, in our solu-
tion, the meta theory is conceptually and literally separated from the object-level theory.
Moreover, operational semantics of the program are equivalent to the declarative semantics
of the object-level theory.
The meta predicate before/2 allows us to specify control information in a clean fashion,
separately from the logical theory about parents and grandparents. Other control predi-
cates that our system makes available to the programmer are notready/1 and hot/1 for the
selection of subgoals to be resolved and clauseorder/2 for the selection of the resolving
clause. When the inference engine chooses the next subgoal to be resolved, it determines
the minimal elements of the partial order defined by before/2. Subgoals that are proved to
be notready/1 may not be chosen; within these constraints, hot/1 subgoals receive priority.
The rule
clauseorder(H, [N1, . . . , Nm]) ← B1, . . . , Bn.
states that clauses whose names belong to N1, . . . , Nm must be selected in that order for the
next inference step if the selected subgoal is an instance of H . The meta predicates clause/2
and goal/2 establish names for clauses and currently active subgoals.9 If the meta rules do
not completely specify the control decisions, the default control is from left to right.
A useful and informative way of describing the semantics of a logic programming
system is to provide a meta-interpreter; [4] follows this approach by showing logic pro-
grams that define the semantics of the control predicates before/2, notready/1, hot/1 and
clauseorder/2. A different—but not less challenging problem—is to turn such a neatly
defined meta logic system into an implementation that integrates a collection of heteroge-
neous reasoning modules, provides a caching mechanism for expensively derived partial
solutions, and offers the meta control predicates to the knowledge engineer as a practical
tool for the orchestration of the various reasoning modules. This is the topic of this paper
and, in particular, of the next section. The semantics of all the meta predicates used in this
system follows that of [4]. We shall not repeat these definitions here; instead, we refer the
reader to that paper for the details of the declarative and procedural specification of the
meta predicates.10
4. Explicit representation
If an inference engine is integrated in a multi-modal reasoning system, other—non-
logic-based—reasoning modules must have access to previously derived knowledge: ev-
erything that has been successfully inferred so far. Resolution provers that do not remember
previously derived knowledge only maintain the current root path of the search tree, which
represents the (partial) proof tree of the current proof attempt. The advantage of main-
taining only the root path is its linear space requirement; the disadvantage is that already-
proven results must be rederived every time they occur on different root paths. Trading
9 The meta predicates var/1 and ground/1 have the usual meaning. Since they have no first-order declarative
semantics, they can, in fact, destroy the equivalence of declarative and operational semantics of the program if
they appear outside the meta level and should therefore be used with care. See the discussion in Section 7.
10 An electronic copy of [4] is available at http://www.ksl.stanford.edu/people/stolle/Papers/
meta96.{pdf,ps}.
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time for space, many problem solvers use some kind of caching of inferences in order to
avoid duplication of effort, to generate explanations, and to guide backtracking or control
[29]. This approach becomes particularly important when—as in the application example
in Section 6 of this paper—the derivations of some formulae require the invocation of other
reasoning modules and are therefore very expensive.
In this section, we describe, in some detail, the form of caching used in our logic system
and the explicit representation that is necessary to achieve it. Since our approach can be
viewed as a very simplified form of truth maintenance, we briefly discuss the similarities
and differences between this approach and traditional truth maintenance systems (TMSs)
and the motivation behind our choices. Finally, we describe how caching and explicit rep-
resentation of the inference state are integrated with abstraction levels and dynamic meta
control.
4.1. Implementation
The system described in this paper is implemented in SCHEME. The state of the in-
ference engine is encapsulated in a stack. The elements of this inference stack are either
“choice points” or inference stacks themselves. A choice point is a branching node in
the search tree. When choosing one of multiple branches, the choice point records the
remaining choices in order to allow the alternative choices to be explored later in the course
of backtracking.11 For example, assume we are trying to prove the subgoal p(X). Further-
more, assume the following two clauses in the database are the only ones whose heads
unify with p(X):
1: p(Y ) ← q(Y ), r(Y ).
2: p(a) ← q(a).
Then the system will create a choice point (abbreviated cp) for the goal p(X) that contains
the matching clauses 1 and 2:
cp = {(p(Y ) ← q(Y ), r(Y )), (p(a) ← q(a))}.
Choice points also keep track of the corresponding bindings.
The typical (and elegant) way of programming a resolution inference engine is to call
the engine recursively to resolve the subgoals of the current goal. However, if we were to
actually do a recursive SCHEME call, the explicit representation of the inference engine
state would be lost, as it would be embedded in the SCHEME call stack. Instead, to keep
the state explicit, we do a “pseudo-recursive” call by pushing a new inference stack onto
the old one and then using only the new inference stack until this simulated recursive call
succeeds or fails. In the latter case, we throw away the new stack; if the simulated recursive
call succeeds, we keep the new inference stack on the old one so we can backtrack into the
call if necessary. We then continue the inference process, using the old inference stack and
pushing new choice points (or inference stacks) above the other inference stack.12
11 Note that a choice point is a node in the search tree; it does not correspond to any single point in the flow
chart of Fig. 1.
12 There are other methods for handling the need for recursive calls. Another embedding of PROLOG into
SCHEME [37] used the fact that SCHEME has first-class continuations to enable backtracking through recursive
calls, and used continuations for non-blind backtracking or “lateral” control transfers. We avoided using con-
tinuations because, although they do provide a handle into the SCHEME control stack, they are still not explicit
enough—continuations are opaque. Our approach of reifying the control explicitly also allows for non-blind
backtracking, though we did not implement it in our system.
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Our inference engine handles normal clauses in a straightforward PROLOG fashion.
To handle embedded implications, we do a pseudo-recursive call to the inference engine,
adding the formulae in the body of the embedded implication to the current assumptions
and setting the current goal to be the head of the embedded implication.
Since the state of the inference engine is encapsulated in a single explicit data structure,
it is trivial to interrupt and resume the inference task: if the inference engine is interrupted,
it simply returns the inference stack. To restart, it is only necessary to call the inference
engine and pass the inference stack back in.
4.2. State transitions
A flow chart of the inference process is shown in Fig. 1. The symbols , , , , and
identify the important internal states of the inference engine. To show how the inference
engine operates, we first describe the various state transitions algebraically and explain
how they relate to the description of query evaluation in Section 2.2. Then, we illustrate
the process by stepping through a concrete example.
The internal state of the theorem prover keeps track of various data structures: G is
the current goal, Sel is the currently selected subgoal, S is the stack of choice points (cor-
responding to the root path of a traditional SLD prover), and Asm is the set of current
assumptions.
Parent_stacks is the stack of stacks that keeps track of the states of the pseudo-recursive-
ly invoked prover instances, as described in the previous subsection. In our actual imple-
mentation, we maintain only one stack, which contains all information that is represented
here by both S and Parent_stacks: the elements of the stack may be either choice points or
whole inference stacks themselves. For the algebraic specification of the state transitions,
however, it is more convenient and elegant to have two variables: S for the choice points
of the current prover instance, and Parent_stacks for the outer prover instances in which
the current prover instance is embedded.
In the following paragraphs, we define the state transitions by providing algebraic equa-
tions that relate the internal state of the engine after the transition to the internal state before
the transition. We use subscripts to refer to the states. For example, in the description of
the transition from State to State , S4 refers to the stack before the transition and S2
refers to the stack after the transition. P always refers to the set of clauses that constitute
the program; P is a constant.
In order to keep this presentation succinct and clear, we omit the description of the
manipulation of the variable bindings that correspond to the transitions.
Initial state
The inference engine starts in State . The stack is empty, there are no assumptions, the
goal is the original query, and no subgoal has been selected yet.
S1 = empty_stack
Asm1 = ∅
G1 = the query
Sel1 = undefined
Parent_stacks1 = empty_stack
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RESTART
Implication?
No Yes
Select formula from G
Is G empty?No
INITIAL
Set G to new goal
Set S to new stack
Save assumptions, goal continuation
Push stack on S
Create new stack
Is S empty?
No Yes
Pop c.p. from S
Select clause from c.p.
Push remainder of c.p. on S
Merge G with clause body
    (if non-empty)
FAILURE
If S has no parent stack
Set S to parent stack
Yes
Meta-control
invoked here
SUCCESS
If S has no parent stack
4
2
3
5
1
Set G to goal continuation
Set S to parent stack
Find unifying clauses
If no unifying clauses
Push new c.p. on S
Determine clause order
Fig. 1. Flow-chart of the inference engine.
From to : selecting an atomic subgoal
This transition corresponds to Steps A1 and A2 from Section 2.2. When moving from
State to State , the engine invokes the dynamic meta control, which selects the current
subgoal from the goal G1. Assume the selected subgoal is the atomic formula A. (For the
case where the subgoal is not atomic, see the transition from to below.)
Sel2 = A
G2 = G1\{A}
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Let cp be the set of matching clauses in P ∪ Asm1:
cp = {(H ← B) | (H ← B) ∈ P ∪ Asm1 ∧ H and A unify}
If such matching clauses exist, the meta control is invoked to determine the order in which
these clauses should be examined. The set of clauses is ordered accordingly (not shown in
these equations) and added as a choice point to the stack:
cp /= ∅ ⇒ S2 = push(cp, S1)
If no matching clauses exist, then no choice points are added to the stack:
cp = ∅ ⇒ S2 = S1
The current assumptions and the stack of parent stacks are not affected by this step:
Asm2 = Asm1
Parent_stacks2 = Parent_stacks1
From to : resolving an atomic subgoal
This transition corresponds to Step A3 from Section 2.2. Assume that the stack S2 is
not empty. (If it is empty, the engine moves to State without any manipulation of the data
structures.) In this step, the engine examines the first of the remaining clauses that resolve
the currently selected subgoal. Let cp be the top choice point on the stack:
cp = top(S2)
We select the first clause from that choice point, push the remainder back on the stack (if
non-empty), and add the body of the selected clause to the current goal:
(H ← B) ∈ cp
cp′ = cp\{(H ← B)}
G1 = G2 ∪ B
cp′ /= ∅ ⇒ S1 = push(cp′, pop(S2))
cp′ = ∅ ⇒ S1 = pop(S2)
The selected subgoal, the current assumptions and the stack of parent stacks are not affected
by this step:
Sel1 = Sel2
Asm1 = Asm2
Parent_stacks1 = Parent_stacks2
From to : Selecting a non-atomic subgoal
This transition corresponds to Step A1 from Section 2.2. When moving from State
to State , the engine invokes the dynamic meta control, which selects the current sub-
goal from the goal G1. As opposed to the transition from to , in which the selected
subgoal was atomic, we now assume that the selected subgoal has the form of an implica-
tion (HG ← BG) where BG /= ∅.
Sel3 = (HG ← BG)
G3 = G1\{(HG ← BG)}
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The stack S, the assumptions Asm and the stack of parent stacks are not affected by this
transition; they will be updated in the transition from to , as explained in the next
paragraph.
S3 = S1
Asm3 = Asm1
Parent_stacks3 = Parent_stacks1
From to : setting up an embedded instance of the prover
This transition corresponds to Step B1 from Section 2.2. When an implication is selected
from the current goal, the engine puts the current proof “on hold” and starts up a new
instance of the prover. In our explicit representation this is achieved by creating a fresh
stack and saving the current stack as a parent stack. Moreover, the engine saves the current
goal as a “goal continuation”, which will be used to continue the current proof when the
engine returns from the proof of the implication. For the duration of the embedded proof,
the body of the implication is added to the set of current assumptions.
Sel3 = (HG ← BG) where BG /= ∅
Parent_stacks1 = push((S3,G3, Asm3), Parent_stacks3)
S1 = empty_stack
Asm1 = Asm3 ∪ BG
G1 = HG
Sel1 = Sel3
The engine returns to State and tries to prove the new goal, G1, relative to the program
P plus the extended current assumptions. This corresponds to Step B2 from Section 2.2.
From to : returning from a successful embedded proof
This step corresponds to Step B3 from Section 2.2. Once all subgoals of the goal have
been resolved, the current goal becomes empty: G5 = ∅. This means that the current in-
stance of the prover has proved its initial goal. In this case, we discard the current instance
of the prover and continue the proof of the parent instance.13 (In this transition, the parent
instance is assumed to exist. The case where no parent stack exists is described in the next
paragraph.)
(S1,G1, Asm1) = top(Parent_stacks5)
Parent_stacks1 = pop(Parent_stacks5)
Sel1 = Sel5
From to SUCCESS: succeeding the overall proof
In this transition, the goal of the outermost prover has become empty. This means the
overall proof has succeeded.
13 As described in Section 4.1, the actual implementation does not discard the embedded stack, so we can
backtrack into it if necessary. For the algebraic description here, in which we ignore variable bindings, we can
discard the embedded stack.
R. Stolle et al. / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 62 (2005) 41–69 53
G={A}
S
Fig. 2. Initial conditions of the inference engine.
From to : returning from a failed embedded proof attempt
The stack S contains the choice points that encode the remaining alternative choices
for previous clause selections. Once S becomes empty, all choices have been exhausted
without having been able to finish the proof. This means the current proof attempt has
failed. Therefore, the current instance of the prover is discarded, signalling a failure to the
parent prover. The parent prover continues from State , exploring possible alternatives for
that clause that contained the embedded (failed) subgoal. (In this transition, we assume that
the current proof is an embedded proof. The case where the current proof is the outermost
proof is described in the next paragraph.)
(S2,G2, Asm2) = top(Parent_stacks4)
Parent_stacks2 = pop(Parent_stacks4)
Sel2 = Sel4
From to FAILURE: failing the overall proof attempt
In this transition, the choice points of the outermost prover have been exhausted without
having been able to completely resolve the original goal. This means the overall proof has
failed.
4.3. Sample inference
To illustrate this more concretely, let us step through the inference process for a simple
query. Let the database of clauses be given by
1: A ← (B ← C),D.
2: A ← X.
3: B ← F.
4: B ← X.
5: D ← E.
6: E.
7: F ← C.
Suppose the query is ?A. The initial conditions of the inference engine are shown in Fig.
2. The top of the stack, S, is empty and the goal set G contains only the query formula:
{A}. The engine starts in State . In this state, the meta control14 for the engine selects
A (the only choice in this case) as the next goal to prove. A choice point (denoted c.p.
in the figure) is created from all clauses in the database and all assumptions in the current
assumption set that unify with the selected formula, A, and this choice point is pushed onto
S. The state becomes .
14 The meta control module selects goals and clauses according to the programmer’s meta control rules, which
are described in Section 3.2 of this paper.
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In Fig. 3 the inference engine is in State , so a choice point is popped off the stack and
a clause is selected to try (again, the meta control makes this decision). In this case, the
chosen clause is A ← (B ← C),D; the remainder of the choices are pushed back onto S,
the state is changed back to , and the goal set G becomes {(B ← C),D}. Again, the meta
control selects a formula from the goal set, namely B ← C. Since this is an embedded
implication, the engine proceeds to State .
In State , a new stack is pushed onto the old stack. The old goal set (called “goal continu-
ation” in the figure), {D}, and a pointer to the old stack top are saved. The head of the embed-
ded implication becomes the (only) goal in the new goal set G, and the formulae in the body
of the implication (called “assumptions” in the figure) are temporarily added to the rule base.
Finally S is set to the top of the new stack and the state becomes (Fig. 4).
Next (Fig. 5), the (only) formula from the goal set is selected, a choice point is pushed
and the current state becomes . Notice that this choice point is pushed onto the inner stack
that was created in State above.
In Figs. 6–8, the inference engine progresses through States , , and until G becomes
empty (Fig. 9). Then, the inference engine proceeds to State . (This means that the subgoal
B ← C, which caused the creation of the second inner stack, was successful.) Then S is
set back to the parent stack and G is reset to the old goal continuation {D}. The current
state becomes as shown in Fig. 10.
G={}
S
A :- X.
A :- (B :- C),D.
Fig. 3. Inference engine, state = .
S
G={(B :- C), D}A :- X.
Fig. 4. Inference engine, state = .
G={B}
A :- X.
Goal continuation={D}
Assumptions={C}
Parent stack
S
Fig. 5. Inference engine, state = .
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Goal continuation={D}
Assumptions={C}
B :- F.
Parent stack
S
G={}
A :- X.
B :- X.
Fig. 6. Inference engine, state = .
S
G={F}
A :- X.
Goal continuation={D}
Assumptions={C}
Parent stack
B :- X.
Fig. 7. Inference engine, state = .
Goal continuation={D}
Assumptions={C}
A :- X.
Parent stack
S
G={}
F :- C.
B :- X.
Fig. 8. Inference engine, state = .
The meta control selects a goal from G and a new choice point is pushed onto S. Note
that the current stack is now equivalent to the original, outer-most one (Fig. 11). The in-
ference engine continues this process until either State or State is reached (failure or
success, respectively), with S pointing to the original outer-most stack.
The explicit representation of embedded call stacks described and illustrated in this sec-
tion is important because it allows previously derived knowledge to be reused and passed
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Goal continuation={D}
Assumptions={C}
.
Parent stack
S
G={}
A :- X.
B :- X.
Fig. 9. Inference engine, state = .
Goal continuation={D}
Assumptions={C}
.
Parent stack
S
G={D}
A :- X.
B :- X.
Fig. 10. Inference engine, state = .
Goal continuation={D}
Assumptions={C}
D :- E.
Parent stack
G={}
S
A :- X.
B :- X.
.
Fig. 11. Inference engine, state = .
around to other (possibly non-logical) reasoning modules. This feature is of crucial impor-
tance for a multi-modal reasoning system, an example of which we describe in Section 6
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of this paper.15 The traditional scheme of recursively calling the inference engine would
hide the current proof tree in the interpreter’s implicit call stack.
In the next section we describe how available knowledge is reused in the inference
process and how it is passed to non-logical reasoning modules.
4.4. Making derived knowledge explicit
We maintain previously derived knowledge for two reasons. First, we want to be able
to pass knowledge explicitly to other reasoning modules. Second, we want to avoid du-
plication of effort. Formulae that have been proved are stored in a database for reuse in
later proofs or subproofs. The second reason is particularly important where the proof of a
formula involves calls to other modules; these calls are typically expensive and should not
be done more often than necessary.
In order to attain both of these goals, we maintain a database (implemented as a hash
table) of previously derived formulae. This database contains formulae that have been
proved in the current inference process, even if these formulae are not in the current proof
tree, i.e., even if they are on a branch of the search tree that failed. However, because it
is impractical to store everything that has been proved, we only cache predicates that the
programmer declares as relevant, using the meta predicate relevant/1 [5]. (This would typ-
ically include those in which multiple modules are interested and those that are expensive
to evaluate.)
Every time the proof of a relevant formula is completed, the database is updated. If
there are no active assumptions, the proven relevant (atomic) formula is simply added to
the database as is. If, however, we are currently in the middle of the proof of an embedded
implication (which means that the set of current assumptions is not empty), the proven
formula might be true only relative to some of the active assumptions. Therefore, we collect
the assumptions that have been used since the start of the inference process for the relevant
goal. If this set of used assumptions is empty, the relevant formula is stored as an atomic
formula in the database. If the set of used assumptions is non-empty, we store a non-atomic
formula—an implication—built from the relevant formula and the used assumptions.
These cached formulae are then used to speed up calls to the same subgoals in later
proof attempts. They are used as if they were program clauses whenever a resolving clause
must be chosen for a given subgoal (State ). They are added at the front of the rule base,
i.e., they receive priority unless the meta control decides otherwise.
In the database, we store only the most-general forms proved so far: if we prove A and B
and Aθ = B for some substitution θ , then we store only A. This amounts to θ-subsumption
[65] in the case of atomic formulae. In the case of embedded goals (implications) this is
only a crude form of caching; handling full θ-subsumption in this general case is NP-com-
plete [33]. However, our (seemingly ad-hoc) form of caching does exactly the right thing:
since calls to expensive modules typically appear—statically—in only a few rules, rarely is
an expensive call subsumed by previous calls but not detected by a purely syntactic check
15 An additional advantage of an explicit representation is that the meta control can choose between all subgoals
in the call stack rather than just the subgoals of the inner-most stack. In this case, nested implications are not
necessarily evaluated before the goal in which they are embedded. However, our implementation does not take
advantage of this possibility. Currently, the reasoner always finishes embedded subgoals before returning to the
embedding goal.
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for generalization or specialization. A full subsumption check would add much complexity
with little gain.
A similar complexity trade-off motivated our decision not to use a full truth maintenance
system [21,29]. In many problem solvers, TMSs provide an elegant solution to reasoning
using beliefs, assumptions, and contexts. Maintaining labels (minimal sets of sufficient
assumptions, in the case of an ATMS) brings complexity that is unnecessary for our pur-
poses. Instead, we provide the programmer with the meta-predicate relevant/1, which is
appropriate tool to maintain just enough information to be able to pass all relevant current
knowledge to other modules while avoiding duplicated work in evaluating time-intensive
predicates.16
The following example illustrates how the “caching technique” described in this section
facilitates efficient interaction with non-logical reasoning modules. Consider the following
program fragment from the domain of ODE theory.
falsum ← time_series(T ), chaotic(T ), periodic(T ).
falsum ← time_series(T ), chaotic(T ), linear(T ).
chaotic(T ) ← time_series(T ), expensive_test(T , chaotic).
periodic(T ) ← time_series(T ), expensive_test(T , periodic).
linear(T ) ← time_series(T ), expensive_test(T , linear).
time_series(ts).
Suppose that ts is an experimental time series that happens to be chaotic (hence non-
periodic). Consider the query falsum ← linear(ts) whose interpretation is: “is the time-
series non-linear?”17 If we assume a depth-first-left-right strategy, the system evaluates the
formulae in the following order:
not(linear(ts))
falsum ← linear(ts)
falsum
chaotic(ts)
expensive_test(ts, chaotic)
periodic(ts)
expensive_test(ts, periodic) fails
falsum
chaotic(ts)
expensive_test(ts, chaotic)
linear(ts) succeeds
The system does not do the numeric test for linearity because we are assuming linear(ts)
in the query. Notice that the numeric test for chaoticity is evaluated twice, even though it
only needs to be done once. For efficiency, we need to cache the result of this evaluation
16 For the case of logic-based truth maintenance systems (LTMS), Everett and Forbus [28] have shown that
freeing facts for garbage collection can often be used to find the right space/time trade-off. As an alternative
solution, we are investigating the notion of “sparse truth maintenance”.
17 The formula linear(ts) represents the fact that all data points of the time series ts lie on a line (modulo some
specified resolution). The ODE rule used in this example is: a linear behavior is neither a periodic behavior nor a
chaotic behavior. This ODE rule is much narrower and much more limited than the more general rule that a linear
ODE system (represented by the formula linear-system(current-model)) cannot be chaotic.
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after the first call so that on the second call the inference system can simply report failure
or success without actually doing the expensive numeric test a second time.
Caching intermediate results is crucial in order to avoid duplication of effort if a formula
appears multiple times in a search tree. The overhead of the cache is negligible compared
to the saved computation time. Storing or retrieving a formula from a hash table takes a
fraction of a second, but the computation that establishes such a formula (e.g., an expensive
numerical test) may take several seconds or even minutes.
This mechanism is critical to the efficiency of any system that uses this framework. The
program in which we have tested this inference system, for example, incorporates a large
variety of heterogeneous reasoning modes: symbolic reasoning, geometric reasoning, qual-
itative simulation, parameter estimation, and numerical simulation. Geometric reasoning
and qualitative simulation are orders of magnitude more expensive than simple symbol-
ic checks, and parameter estimation and numerical simulation are even more expensive.
Therefore, the term “caching” may be misleading for the inference engine’s technique of
storing and reusing previously derived formulae. The caching mechanism is not merely a
matter of making the program more efficient by a small percentage. It makes heterogeneous
reasoning feasible.
4.5. Integration of the three goals
The previous section explains how our implementation maintains derived knowledge,
thereby allowing that knowledge to be passed to other modules. In this section, we describe
where and how the solutions that achieve the other goals of the work described in this pa-
per—equivalence of declarative and operational semantics, and declarative representation
of control information—fit into this picture.
Relevant formulae are handled by the inference engine in the same way as embedded
implications are. Conceptually, a new incarnation of an inference process tries to finish a
proof of the relevant subgoal before other subgoals receive attention.18 In State of Fig.
1, for example, if the selected formula is deemed relevant, the inference engine passes to a
State (similar to State ), where a new stack is pushed onto the old stack. The new goal
set contains only the relevant formula, and the engine goes back to State . Later, when
State or is reached (success or failure in proving the relevant formula, respectively),
the engine will, before resuming the inference, store the result of the pseudo-recursion,
as described in Section 4.1. This means that declaration of relevance takes priority over
control decisions that are specified by meta rules. The advantage of this approach is that it
is easy to keep track of when a relevant formula has been proved.
The inference engine handles the abstraction levels by iterating from the most-abstract
level to less-abstract levels. Abstraction levels are identified by the programmer, who as-
signs a natural number (an “abstraction level number”) to each clause. For example, in
the domain of ODE modeling, the abstraction levels are used to express static control
knowledge of the type: “In general, try to build proofs involving qualitative properties of
candidate ODE models before building proofs involving numeric properties”. First, only
the clauses on the most-abstract level are considered. If this proof attempt fails, the clauses
from the next abstraction level are added, and so on, until the proof succeeds or all levels
are exhausted. Maintaining the database of derived knowledge reduces duplication of effort
18 Gallaire and Lasserre [32] achieve a similar effect using the predicate finish.
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that would occur when knowledge has to be rederived in later iterations. Avoiding dupli-
cation of effort is, in general, crucial to all inference tasks that involve expensive proofs or
repeated calls to time-consuming reasoning modules.
The meta-level control strategy is integrated into the inference engine at two points:
when a subgoal is selected to be resolved (in State ) and when a resolving clause is
selected (in State ). These two points are marked “Meta-control invoked here” in the
inference engine flow-chart (Fig. 1). In order to select a subgoal, the inference engine is
called recursively19 to evaluate all notready-, before-, and hot-rules (see Section 3.2) that
apply to the current situation. We call the facts that are proved by these evaluations of meta
rules the current control facts. From the current goal, the meta control chooses a subgoal
that meets all constraints imposed by the current control facts. In order to select a clause,
the meta control is only consulted the first time the inference engine reaches this choice
point. Again, the meta control evaluates all clauseorder-rules that apply to the current
situation in order to derive the current control facts. The meta control then determines an
ordering of all matching clauses that meets all constraints that are expressed by the current
control facts. The first clause in this ordering is chosen to resolve the current subgoal of
the object-level proof. If the same choice point is reached again later via backtracking,
the other clauses can be used in the already-determined order; meta control need not be
invoked again. Please consult [4] for a formal description of the semantics of the control
predicates.
5. Correctness and completeness
Generalized Horn Clause Logic is intuitionistically equivalent to a certain subset of
McCarty’s Clausal Intuitionistic Logic [45,46]. According to Tobermann [63], the calculus
of generalized Horn clauses upon which our theorem prover is based is logically sound and
complete. Since the prover performs depth-first search, it is combinatorially incomplete in
the same way as PROLOG is: it cannot effectively find a proof for a logical consequence of
the theory represented by the program if its derivation is hidden by an infinite path in the
search tree. The introduction of control rules into generalized Horn clause logic does not
affect the soundness of the proof procedure. Control rules cannot “generate” new solutions
that are not logical consequences of the logic program.
Control rules for the selection of subgoals preserve not only correctness but also com-
pleteness. Tobermann [63] has also shown that the selection function for a RISC-type prover
may perform arbitrary computations. The only condition that the selection function has to
meet in order to preserve completeness is that it must be a total function that selects one
of the current subgoals. Ordering of clauses does not affect the logical completeness.20 It
does, however, affect combinatorial completeness; a different order may make the prover
follow an infinite path before it finds some logical consequence of the program. One of the
intended usages of the meta predicate clauseorder/2 is—in addition to efficiency consid-
erations—to (dynamically) determine a combinatorially complete clause order. Given the
19 A recursive call to the inference engine allows the full generality of the theorem prover to be used for meta
control in a simple and elegant fashion.
20 In our system, clause ordering only decides when a clause is applied, not whether it is applied. This stands
in contrast to other information prioritization systems, in which prioritization amounts to an exclusive choice
between possibly conflicting pieces of information [54].
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meta control predicates described in Section 3.2, this can be effected by the programmer
in an easy and intuitive way.
The calculus that results from adding the abstraction level mechanism to the RISC-type
prover is also correct and complete. First, consider correctness. More-abstract reasoning
only takes away solutions of the program; it never adds new solutions. Thus, the result-
ing calculus is correct. Completeness is somewhat more subtle. The completeness of the
underlying inference engine implies that the reasoning process is complete relative to the
set of rules that are in use. However, reasoning performed at a more-abstract level is typ-
ically incomplete with respect to a less-abstract level. This is exactly our intention: to
mask out logical consequences of the program that lead to too-detailed reasoning too early.
Since queries ultimately fail only after the inference engine has considered all rules at all
abstraction levels, the overall process is complete.
Both correctness and completeness are also preserved by the caching mechanism. A
formula is only stored if it has been proved. Since the knowledge base does not change
during the evaluation of a query, a stored formula remains true for the whole evaluation
process and can thus be reused. A formula that is true only with respect to an extended
context (that is, a set of assumptions) is stored as an implication whose body consists
of those assumptions. These conditional formulae are also valid and do not affect cor-
rectness. Likewise, completeness remains unaffected by the caching mechanism since no
rules are removed from the logic program; rather, the cache is added in front of the logic
program. Solutions may be found in a different order, however; currently, they are also
found multiple times if the theorem prover first uses cached results and later also uses the
corresponding original rules. This only poses a problem if the user asks for several proofs
of a query, or if excessive backtracking occurs within a proof. A version of the cache
manager that avoids even these duplication problems is currently under construction. In
that version, every cached formula will maintain a pointer to the rules from which it was
derived, along with some other book-keeping information.
In the application example described in the next section, the inference engine’s task is
to find the first proof of the query falsum.
6. An example
The logic system presented in this paper has successfully been used as a knowledge rep-
resentation and reasoning framework in the domain of ODE theory. The program
PRET [10,61] automates system identification [43]: given hypotheses, observations, and
specifications, it constructs an ODE model of a black-box dynamical system. PRET uses the
given hypotheses to construct a sequence of candidate models and checks each candidate
against the observations. The first candidate that passes this check is returned as the answer.
In this section, we describe how PRET employs our logic system to perform this model
check.
PRET’s knowledge base encodes ODE theory in GHCIL clauses. The person who imple-
ments or maintains this knowledge base will presumably be an expert in engineering—not
logic programming—so the declarative representation of knowledge without the use of
“hack type” efficiency side effects is crucial. The concept of negation as inconsistency is
ideal for this application: the candidate model checker combines the observations about the
target system, the observations about the candidate model, and the ODE theory into one
set of clauses and then checks that set for consistency, i.e., tries to derive falsum from it.
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This instantiates PRET’s opportunistic paradigm: a candidate that provides no reason for
an inconsistency is considered a good model.
Checking candidate models against the given observations poses a difficult reasoning
control problem, but one that can be solved elegantly using the framework described in this
paper. The model checker makes use of several non-logic-based modules, e.g., the com-
mercial symbolic algebra package Maple [18], a simple qualitative envisioning module, a
non-linear numerical parameter estimator [11], and a geometric reasoner for intelligent data
analysis [9]. Calls to these modules require knowledge to be passed to them explicitly. By
declaring the appropriate predicates as “relevant”, the PRET knowledge engineer instructs
the inference engine to make the appropriate pieces of knowledge available. Different rea-
soning techniques vary considerably in their cost. Symbolic techniques are usually quick
and cheap; the order of an ODE, for example, can be established within a fraction of a
second. Semi-numeric and numeric techniques take much longer. The time taken by a
call to PRET’s parameter estimation module, for example, ranges between a couple of
seconds and several minutes. What PRET needs in order to manage the complexity of its
task—finding an ODE model for a given dynamic system—is the ability to dynamically
orchestrate application of its ODE rules and the various reasoning modes that are triggered
by the resulting evaluations, all in a manner that leads to the quickest possible test of a
given model.
The three techniques described in this paper—abstraction levels, dynamic meta control,
and reuse of previously derived formulae—achieve exactly this intelligent orchestration of
reasoning modes. We use the concept of abstraction levels (see Section 3.1) to direct the
search for an inconsistency toward a quick, abstract proof. For example, qualitative rea-
soning rules are assigned a more-abstract level than rules that encode numerical reasoning.
As a result, PRET tries to discard models by purely qualitative means before resorting to
numerical techniques. In other qualitative reasoning systems that work with different ab-
straction levels (e.g., [52,70]), the levels are implicitly defined by the system’s architecture
and data structures. In PRET, every rule is explicitly assigned an abstraction level number.
Similarly, the logic engine’s dynamic control is used in PRET to guide the search toward a
cheap and quick proof of falsum. Rules that are likely to lead to a contradiction are chosen
before other rules, and subgoals that are likely to fail quickly are evaluated before other
subgoals. As an example, consider the following (simplified) program.
stable ← linear, all_roots_in_left_half_plane.
stable ← non_linear, stable_in_all_basins.
hot(L) ← linear, goal(L, stable).
In this example, the control rule specifies that reasoning about the system’s stability should
be done early on if that reasoning is known to be cheap, e.g., if the system is known
to be linear. Stability reasoning does not get priority, however, in the non-linear—expen-
sive—case. The domain-specific reasoning behind this control flow is as follows: A linear
dynamical system has a unique equilibrium point, and the stability of that point—and there-
fore of the system as a whole—can be determined by examining the system’s eigenvalues,
a simple symbolic manipulation of the coefficients of the equation. Non-linear systems
can have arbitrary numbers of equilibrium sets. These attractors are expensive to find and
evaluate. Thus, if a system is known to be linear, its overall stability is easy to estab-
lish, whereas evaluating the stability of a non-linear system is far more complicated and
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expensive. The framework described in this paper not only makes it easy for a domain
expert to specify this kind of knowledge, but also turns that knowledge to advantage in
an elegant and powerful way. PRET’s meta theory, which captures key concepts in differ-
ential equations and dynamical systems, allows the inference system to take advantage of
the dynamic dependencies described above. The major advantage of this approach is that
PRET’s control knowledge is separated from the ODE theory and does not interfere with the
ODE theory’s declarative semantics. This example illustrates how control information that
originates in a domain expert’s understanding of the application domain can be expressed
cleanly and intuitively using the logic system described in this paper.
Embedded implications are also a useful tool in the automated modeling domain. As an
example consider the following (simplified) rule, which expresses the simplest input/out-
put stability notion for control systems, called “bounded-input, bounded-output stability”
(BIBO) [43].
stable ← (bounded_output ← bounded_input).
Furthermore, embedded implication is at work every time a negated goal is evaluated.
The reason for this is that—as described in Section 2—our system interprets not/1 as ne-
gation as inconsistency: every subgoal not(p) is replaced by the embedded implication
(falsum ← p).
Even though the computational complexity of PRET’s model checker has not yet been
formally analyzed, experiments (e.g., [10,27]) show that it performs well on engineering
textbook problems. The recursive call of the inference engine that evaluates the bodies of
control rules may be viewed as a potential source of complexity, or even infinite loops. In
practice, however, the proofs of control rules bottom out quickly.
Recently, there has been an interesting discussion in the AI community about the need
for domain-dependent control information in any application. Theoretically, there is no
need for domain-dependent control because control knowledge can be factorized into do-
main-independent control information and domain-dependent modal information [49] that
encodes the structure of the search space [34]. While this elegant result is true for logic
programming in general, the PRET project (and others projects as well, e.g., [51]) is a
prime example of an application that requires a different approach. Having to think about
control in terms of the structure of the search space is exactly what we want to avoid.
The implementer of the knowledge base should instead approach it from the viewpoint
of his/her domain: which rules are more abstract than others, which rules or goals trigger
expensive calls to other packages, and so on.
7. Context and related work
The work described in this paper draws upon ideas and techniques from several areas of
mathematics, engineering, and computer science; citing more than the few most important
and/or most closely related publications in each of these areas would yield an excessive
bibliography. In this section, we mention only the most closely related publications from
the large body of literature on meta-level systems and control. References to related work
that appear in the body of the paper will not be repeated here.
Some of the earliest work on meta control includes [20,24,25,31,32]. More recently,
implemented logic programming languages (e.g., [4,36,38]) have been influenced by these
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ideas. Furthermore, automated planning systems (e.g., [2,16,57]) typically employ meta-
level decision-making. The planning system TLPlan uses temporal logic to express control
information [1]. The constraint-based framework of Satplan and Graphplan allows such
rules to be compiled into these planners [39]. An answer-set programming approach to
the domain-dependent control of planners was presented in [56]. Moreover, the notion of
specifying control has also been applied to the situation calculus [42].
In a different, but related, branch of the literature—called strategic proof planning—
strategies that guide the proof search are explicitly represented as plans and dynamically
refined during the theorem proving process [15]. This approach adds a form of explicit
global control to the low-level, local, tactical control decisions of a theorem prover. Work in
this area spans from the earliest research by Bundy [14] to contemporary theorem provers
and integrated mathematical assistants (e.g., [7,17,40,47,48]).
The automated deduction community has produced a large body of systems and litera-
ture on tactical and strategic control of deduction (see, for example, [35]). Denzinger et al.
[23] describe a system that learns to re-enact previously successful proof attempts in the
domain of purely equational theorem proving. The system finds solved problems that are
analogous to the current problem and adapts the corresponding known proof. The search is
distributed across a multi-agent architecture whose selection strategies and heuristics are
expressed declaratively, using domain-specific terms.
There are important differences between the control of theorem provers in the field of
automated deduction and the work presented in this paper. In automated deduction, proving
theorems is the primary aim of the system. Our system, on the other hand, is designed to
facilitate the expression of control knowledge in the context of a particular application
domain. Theorem proving is just the vehicle, not the goal. In the application domain exam-
ple in the previous section, for example, the formulation of meta-level control knowledge
is crucial to the effective orchestration of a heterogeneous reasoning process: automated
system identification. The underlying mathematical theory of system identification—ODE
theory—is expressed as a logical theory; hence, the control of PRET’s reasoning is an
instance of control of automated deduction. However, PRET employs only one theorem
prover. Unlike automated deduction systems that orchestrate a suite of theorem provers
(e.g., [22]), PRET orchestrates a suite of non-logic-based reasoning modules by deciding
when to invoke which one and by making the results available to other modules in form of
logical formulae.
In PRET’s logical paradigm [60], the invocation of modules is triggered by the eval-
uation of resolution goals. Therefore, some of the control information that is expressed
through the dynamic ordering of goals and clauses corresponds to what in automated de-
duction is called strategic information. This uniform framework of expressing all control
as control of a resolution prover has proven useful and intuitive in our application domain.
The combination of static abstraction levels and dynamic meta level control rules allows
for an effective orchestration of the automated system identification task.
Meta languages have a long history in logic and logic programming [62]. Meta language
constructs whose semantics are similar to the constructs in our system were suggested by
Gallaire and Lasserre [31,32]; however, their specification of the semantics was vague.
Declaration of relevancy has a similar effect as Gallaire and Lasserre’s finish predicate.
The idea of establishing a relationship between clauses and their names also stems from
[32]. Our notready/1 predicate is also similar to NU-PROLOG’s wait predicate [53] and
GÖDEL’s delay predicate [38]. Amalgamated meta-level inference for SLDNF resolution
was presented by [8,69].
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A terminology for meta-level systems was suggested by van Harmelen [66]. Accord-
ing to that classification, our system is a bilingual object-level inference system with a
ground representation of object-level goals and clauses on the meta-level. Unlike some
other systems in that category [4], our system provides no guards to express directionality.
If guards were available, meta predicates like var/1 and ground/1 could be used to choose
appropriate clauses without interfering with the declarative semantics of the clauses. In our
system, however, such meta predicates appear in the body of the clause and must therefore
be used with care. In the bodies of meta rules we allow the full GHCIL language instead of
restricting the meta language to Horn clauses. To evaluate meta-level control clauses, the
GHCIL inference engine simply calls itself pseudo-recursively instead of switching to an
Earley theorem prover [3,26]. We also added the notion of abstraction levels, as described
in previous sections.
Another deviation from [4]—as discussed in Section 4.4—is that we do not make use
of a full ATMS. Instead, we store proven goals with relevant predicates in a hash table.
Another approach to caching partial results is known as tabling, which is implemented in
XSB.21 From a computational complexity perspective, our approach is currently inferior
to an ATMS or a tabling approach because adding cached solutions at the front of the
regular solutions may in the worst case increase the program complexity exponentially.
However, in our specific application, extensive backtracking and/or search for multiple
answers is rare, and we were thus able to avoid this problem. Also, we are currently devel-
oping a version of the caching in which every cached formula will maintain a pointer to the
rules from which it was derived, along with some other book-keeping information. From
a functionality perspective, our approach provides additional functionality over current
implementations of tabling: for hypothetical goals, which are derived in the context of a
nested (non-Horn) clause, the goal is stored together with the context in which it is valid.
In the Foreword to [38], Robinson calls the difference between pure logic programming
and applied logic programming “a gap that has plagued the relational logic programming
community since the birth of PROLOG in the early 1970s”. In a perfect world, “programs
are first-order theories, and computations are deductions from them”. Recently, several
papers (for example, [41]) have assigned declarative semantics to procedural constructs
like the cut or negation as failure by stratifying programs or restricting program models.
Our solution to this problem is to disallow procedural constructs and to restrict negation
syntactically to negation as inconsistency with intuitionistic semantics.
The problem of ordering query subgoals—and optimizing queries in general—has been
studied in both the database and the logic programming communities (e.g., [55,68]). The
continuing attempts of the logic programming community to make applied logic programs
more declarative and thus more readable and comprehensible has a strikingly similar coun-
terpart in the database community. Relational query languages [64] allow the desired data
to be specified declaratively. Query optimizers, however, are typically programmed in pro-
cedural terms. One might argue that query optimizers in databases correspond to control
components in logic programs. Cherniack has developed a system that expresses the in-
formation as to how queries are optimized declaratively as well, namely as declarative
rewrite rules [19]. In a sense, the concept of declarativeness is moving down the food
chain. Naturally, this has to stop somewhere: Cherniack’s system specifies the information
“which rewrite rule should be applied when” in procedural terms. Similarly, our system
executes the bodies of control rules from left to right, i.e., procedurally.
21 http://xsb.sourceforge.net
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8. Conclusion
We have presented an implemented logic system whose language is that of general-
ized Horn clause intuitionistic logic with negation as inconsistency. The system achieves
three important goals: equivalence of declarative and operational semantics, explicit and
declarative representation of control information, and smooth interaction among various
heterogeneous reasoning modes. We believe that these ideas can play an important role in
solutions to the general problem of how to specify control and reasoning strategies in AI
systems.
These goals have been accomplished by integrating and implementing several careful-
ly chosen techniques. Static abstraction levels and dynamic meta control rules explicitly
specify the deduction strategy of the inference engine, thereby allowing the reasoner to
intelligently navigate in the search tree. An explicit representation of the theorem prover’s
state allows information to be passed between various logical and non-logical reasoning
modules. The abstraction levels and meta control rules specified by the programmer orches-
trate the calls to these reasoning modules. Furthermore, an intelligent caching mechanism
stores relevant formulae and makes them available for reuse in later proof attempts. Typical
examples of such relevant formulae are intermediate results of expensive calls to various
reasoning modules.
As an example, we have incorporated our system into PRET, an automated modeling
tool that reasons about ordinary differential equations (ODEs). The logic system described
in this paper is an effective and efficient reasoning core for this process. Its design allows
a domain expert to express knowledge about dynamic systems and ODEs in a natural, de-
clarative manner. The control information, which specifies how the domain knowledge is to
be processed, is also formulated declaratively, but separately from the domain knowledge.
This approach facilitates correctness and clarity of the domain knowledge because the
expert need not be concerned with control strategies when formulating knowledge about
mathematical truths about dynamic systems and ODEs. As demonstrated in the PRET sys-
tem, an appropriate set of control rules leads to the desirable behavior of the reasoner,
which—in this case—amounts to an efficient search for an ODE: one that prioritizes cheap,
abstract-level reasoning over expensive low-level reasoning whenever possible. Finally,
the system identification task draws on a variety of heterogeneous reasoning modules. The
logic system described in this paper allows PRET to smoothly integrate these modules with
each other, orchestrating them through careful control of its first-order theorem prover.
The system described in this paper implements an approach that can be viewed as a
hybrid between what is known as tactical and strategic control in automated theorem prov-
ing. Rather than using different control mechanisms for tactical and strategic control, a
PRET knowledge engineer expresses all control as control of a resolution prover. Combined
with the abstraction hierarchy of more and more refined domain theories, this approach
provides—in our experience—just the right tools for an effective orchestration of the auto-
mated system identification task. More generally, we expect that our approach will prove
useful in other complex AI tasks that require the integration of heterogeneous reasoning
modules that employ different reasoning paradigms. The conceptually clear separation be-
tween object-level domain knowledge and dynamic meta-level control knowledge, along
with the domain theory’s abstraction levels, allows for a formulation of control informa-
tion that corresponds directly to the user’s intuitions about more-abstract and less-abstract
concepts and about more-expensive and less-expensive reasoning techniques in the ap-
plication domain. The main goal of the design presented in this paper is not to give the
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logic system the means to learn or improve its reasoning strategies. Rather, it is to give
the user (or knowledge engineer) the means to formalize domain-dependent information
about various degrees of abstraction and about various degrees of reasoning cost in a way
that is conceptually clear and that corresponds to a body of knowledge and expertise in the
application domain. For this reason, a numerical comparison of PRET’s performance with
and without meta-control (along the lines of [50], for example) would be besides the point.
PRET’s control information does not merely make its reasoning more efficient; it makes it
feasible. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to better understand the computational cost
of PRET’s meta-control module, and we are currently working on an empirical evaluation.
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